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 The divergent paths taken by Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas and 
Emmanuel Levinas have their common source in a disappointment with 
Edmund Husserl’s promise to bring philosophy back to life by way of the 
phenomenological method. Each of Husserl's students turns phenomenology 
in an existential direction and claims to account for our deepest 
responsibilities as human beings.  
 Levinas and Jonas, however, write from an even graver 
disappointment with how their teacher, Heidegger, exploits 
phenomenology. Though each acclaims Being and Time as a masterpiece, 
each condemns their mentor for portraying a self-centered existence 
that pivots around the individual’s anxiety in the face of freedom-
unto-death.1 And each diagnoses Heidegger's fundamental ontology as 
symptomatic of a larger cultural crisis in which the human will is 
regarded as the creative ground of all moral value. Each contends that 
what gets lost in Heidegger - and, at the very least, in modern 
philosophy in general - is the way our existence is oriented by our 
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obligation to a Good-in-itself that commands us from beyond our 
humanity. And each traces this transcendent Good to the God of Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob. In this respect, each finds in Judaism the resources 
to respond to the spirit of nihilism embodied by Heidegger’s thought. 
 Levinas and Jonas, however, find it incumbent on themselves as 
philosophers not to ground ethics in dogmatic faith. And neither 
believes he has to, for each argues that the Good is accessible to 
human experience through creation. Consequently, one does not need to 
be a Jew or consult Torah - or even believe in God’s existence or 
interpet the world as creation - in order to be held responsible before 
the tribunal of the Good. Though Torah is the medium of Judaic faith in 
its particularity, the ethical message of Judaism is universally 
available in the meaning that our existence reveals on its own terms. 
God, one might say, has created the world in such a way that the moral 
law and our capacity to receive it are part of the immanent structure 
of creation.  
 The glaring difference between Levinas and Jonas lies in where 
they place the Good in creation, and how they explain the relationship 
between the Good and God. I propose to imagine the steps in a dialogue 
between Levinas and Jonas, who, so far as I know, never engaged 
eachother in person or writing after their student years in Weimar 
Germany. Because both are formidable thinkers, I must introduce each in 
his own right before the dialogue can begin. 
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I. Levinas: Jerusalem and Athens 
  
 Levinas accuses the entire history of Western ontology “from 
Parmenides on” of being driven by the urge to bring Being under the 
command of the thinking self, so that the "Other" (or "Infinite") can 
be corralled within the horizon of the ego’s own cares and 
possibilities.2 This sweeping indictment permits Levinas to draw a stark 
contrast between two roads in Western thought: 1) an avenue originating 
in Athens - the egoism of ontology, with its penchant for a 
"totalizing" grasp of Being - and 2) a path, emanating from Jerusalem, 
that is less travelled by philosophers and that Levinas calls 
“metaphysics.”3 Following Rosenzweig and Heidegger, Levinas sees modern 
philosophy not as decisively breaking from ancient Greek thought, but 
as completing a rationalism that was already at work in Athens. But 
against Heidegger, who traces that rationalism to Plato's "metaphysics 
of presence" and tries in his later work to recover the meaning of 
Being by turning to pre-Socratic ontology, Levinas joins Rosenzweig in 
bidding us to walk the path towards Jerusalem before heading for 
Athens.  
 The heart’s desire of the Jerusalemite, the metaphysician, is not 
to think Being but to be ethically responsible for the Other, whose 
very face is received as the locus of God’s commandment, “Thou shalt 
not murder.” The face is a vessel of the Torah’s prophetic call to give 
to “the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor.” The quality of 
our lives is measured, in Levinas’s Judaic tradition, not by our 
knowledge or authenticity, but by the attention we pay to these 
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“Others”: the needy whose cries are inconvenient and whose lives may 
seem useless to those intent on comprehending Being. 
 But what has Levinas’s move from Being to “the Other” to do with 
philosophy? Doesn’t pitting Jerusalem against Athens, metaphysics 
against ontology, also mean pitting faith against philosophy, 
revelation against reason? Levinas answers "No!," contending that 
Judaism's message does not require submission to the texts or laws of 
the Jewish tradition in particular, but is immediately available to 
every human being in what the human face-to-face encounter reveals on 
its own terms. And this encounter can be articulated philosophically. 
 Worldly things derive their meaning from the roles they play 
within a context organized around the cognitive powers and practical 
needs of the ego. Knowing, using and enjoying things in one's 
environment involve “assimilating” what is alien to "the Same." The 
Other, however, has absolute meaning “all by himself,” prior to how he 
fits into the ego’s grasp of Being. When the face is encountered for 
what it is, Levinas says, the inexhaustibility of what it signifies - 
the Other - is welcomed as a Good-in-itself for whom I am responsible. 
This transcendent Good is acknowledged in its “Infinity,” as coming 
from “beyond Being,” neither in a Platonic intellectual intuition nor 
in a Heideggerian mood of anxiety, but in the feeling of shame that 
attests to the awakening of one’s conscience before the Other. Levinas 
writes: 
  
 Conscience... is the revelation of a resistance to my powers that 
 does not counter them as a greater force, but calls into question 
 the naive right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living 
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 being. Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified 
by  itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent... The Other is 
 not initially a fact, is not an obstacle, does not threaten me 
 with death; he is desired in my shame.4 
  
 Levinas’s key idea is that the Other is not just an alter ego, 
for if he were, then our relationship would be symmetrical: I would be 
another You, and You another I. Levinas goes beyond Martin Buber’s 
account of the I/Thou relationship by insisting that I am more 
responsible for you than you are for yourself, and that my 
responsibility for you is not contingent upon your mutuality.5 You 
approach me from a height. You face me immediately, before I face 
myself. I only face myself - to the extent that I ever do - when I step 
back in reflection, but by that time I have already been claimed by the 
commandment to serve your good. Here’s how Levinas puts it: 
  
 The Other is higher than I am because the first word of the face 
 is “Thou shalt not murder.” It is an order. There is a 
commandment  in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke 
to me.  However, at the same time the face of the Other is 
destitute; it  is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe 
all. I,  whoever I may be, as the “first person,” I am he who finds 
the  resources to respond to the call. The mastery of the Other and 
his  poverty, with my submission and my wealth... are presupposed in 
 all human relationships. If it were not, then we would not even 
 say, before an open door, “After you, Sir!” It is an original 
 “After you, Sir!” that I have tried to describe.6 
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 Ethics can only get a foothold in our lives, Levinas insists, if 
we can overcome our natural temptation to "look out for old number 
one." He notes: 
  
 There is a Jewish proverb which states that ‘the other’s 
 material needs are my spiritual needs’: it is this 
 disproportion, or asymmetry, that characterizes the ethical 
 refusal of the first truth of ontology - the struggle to be. 
 Ethics is, therefore, against nature because it forbids the 
 murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first.7 
 
Each organism orders its world around its own survival and prosperity 
and is, at bottom, states Levinas, “hateful” of others.8 Life on its own 
terms is a war of all against all. Even that sublime accomplishment of 
the cogito - ontology - is, by Levinas’s rendering, just a 
sophisticated means by which we humans express our conatus essendi - 
our animal will-to-live - by mastering what is around us. Levinas goes 
so far as to associate Heidegger's fundamental ontology with Darwin's 
account of the life-world. 
 
 Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time that Dasein is 
a  being who is concerned for this being itself. That's Darwin's 
 idea: the living being struggles for life. The aim of being is 
 being itself.9  
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Within nature, there are subjective goods, but no objective Good-in-
itself, says Levinas, and so no basis for ethical responsibility.   
 Consequently, the very possibility of ethics demands reference to 
a supernatural Good: a meaning that reveals itself from “beyond Being” 
because it requires one to be able to sacrifice one's interests - and 
even one’s life - for the sake of the Other. Regardless of whether one 
identifies the Other’s face as the trace of God, one is responding to a 
supernatural summons when one suppresses nature in order to welcome 
one’s neighbor. Our bodies sets the stage for our being able to 
transcend our nature and condemn “the survival of the fittest” in the 
name of “Shalom!” And paradoxically, we reveal our spirituality most 
fundamentally by tending to the material needs of others: the needs of 
life itself.  
 Levinas agrees that the ethical message he discerns within the 
I/You encounter is perhaps best exemplified by Jesus’s selfless 
lovingkindness - and the Biblical paradigm of Levinasian neighborliness  
is, I believe, the Good Samaritan. But Levinas interprets the Gospels 
as conveying the same basic lesson that was already present in the 
Prophets' injunction to give to “the orphan, the widow, the stranger 
and the poor.” Still, Levinas’s emphasis on agape - one’s exclusive, 
self-sacrificing exposure to the particular Other one happens to face - 
seems to conflict with the Prophets’ ideal of justice: a moral 
principle that requires that all Others, and even oneself, as “the 
Other of Others,” be respected equally.  
 Levinas concedes that love needs justice, Jerusalem needs Athens,  
because the “third parties” who stand outside the immediacy of the 
I/You encounter are also one’s neighbors. Justice demands that 
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incomparables be compared: that the unique Other to whom one is 
absolutely devoted be placed within the wider human community and be 
acknowledged as "only one among others.” Justice requires that the 
conscientious self step back from the immediacy of the one-for-another 
and adopt a posture of neutrality: treating everyone as having equal 
rights. Levinas acknowedges that justice is recommended by the Torah 
itself, but argues that ethical priority lies in mercy (rahamim): 
simple acts of generosity. Long before the recently celebrated debate 
between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan over the relative 
importance of justice and care, the Judaic tradition has known that a 
concern with justice’s “abstract order of rules” too easily degenerates 
into an “ideological rationalism” that is forgetful of the unique Other 
who needs a helping hand.10 
 It should come as no surprise to us now that Levinas reads the 
encounter with God - one’s submission before the majesty of the Other 
who commands from “on high” - into the phenomenology of the interhuman 
relationship itself. In presenting itself as coming from beyond the 
world organized around one’s own, and even society’s, needs, the face 
of the Other person is the “trace” of the divine. Metaphysics, in 
Levinas’s sense, is ethics because the Good-in-itself is revealed in 
the experience of one-for-another. And ethics, in turn, is already 
religion: because proximity to God can arise only through devotion to 
the other person. The transcendent is an immanent moment of the ethical 
relation itself. The personal presence of God resides in the I/You 
encounter, and love of God resides in love of neighbor. 
 But isn’t faith something above and beyond morality? Levinas 
relates an anecdote told by Hannah Arendt shortly before her death. 
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“When she was a child in her native Konigsberg, one day she said to the 
rabbi who was teaching her religion: “You know, I have lost my faith.” 
And the rabbi responded: “Who’s asking for it?”” Levinas remarks:  
  
 [T]he response was typical. What matters is not ‘faith,’ but 
 ‘doing.’... [A]re believing and doing different things? What does 
 believing mean? What is faith made of? Words, ideas? Convictions? 
 What do we believe with? With the whole body! With all my bones. 
 (Psalm 35:10) What the rabbi meant was: “Doing good is the act of 
 belief itself.” That is my conclusion.11 
  
 Levinas concedes that the Christian idea of God’s kenosis - the 
humility of God’s willingness “to live and die for all men” by 
appearing on earth as the suffering servant of the vulnerable - is 
“close to the Jewish sensibility.”12 But he rejects the theological 
concepts of transubstantiation and the Eucharist that come to surround 
the personality of Jesus. Indeed, "theo-logy" - with its “Greek” root 
in the desire to comprehend God’s nature, the nature of perfect 
substance - is a kind of idolatry: the exercise of “the spiritually 
refined” who, in the telling words of Isaiah 58, want to see the face 
of God and enjoy His proximity before they have freed their slaves and 
fed their hungry. Theology's focus on the epistemic issue of whether 
faith is credible distracts us from Judaism's ethical message: that 
belief lies in mitzvot, the performance of good works.  
 Levinas’s account of how God presents Himself, as forever absent, 
through the face of the other person - captures three crucial features 
of the Judaic idea of God. First, God is infinitely Other. It would be 
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idolatry to believe that one can grasp Him in a finite image. Divine 
incarnation is foreign to Judaic spirituality. Yahweh - He whose face 
no human can look upon and survive - has abdicated us out of trust in 
our ability to hear Him from afar. Second, in His infinite separation 
from us, God nonetheless remains present, for His law is revealed 
through the face of the Other. To compensate for His separation from 
us, God has put Torah into his childrens’ hands, and, writes Levinas, 
“one is justified in loving Torah even more than God.” It is the glory 
of Judaism, according to Levinas, to welcome a God who does not want to 
possess us but who wants us to be responsible so that our work has real 
importance. “To veil His face in order to demand everything from man”: 
this, remarks Levinas, is “an austere humanism bound to a difficult 
adoration.”13 Finally, Levinas’s is a personal God who singles each of 
us out for responsibility. We stand alone not, as Heidegger would have 
it, before our own death, but in the irreplaceable burden we bear for 
those whose lives embody a Good-in-itself that absolutely transcends 
our own life and death.    
 Levinas brings all humans into the orbit of Judaic experience 
because the I/You encounter, constitutive of being a human agent, bears 
pre-philosophical and even pre-textual testimony to the Judaic 
understanding of the relationship between humanity and God. “Thou shalt 
not murder” is, as Levinas puts it, “a Saying that is prior to any 
Said”14: an imperative addressed to the singular individual, through the 
face of the Other, that precedes all products of tradition or 
reflection, including ontological accounts of the meaning of Being. 
Though commandment takes possession of the ego before one has time to 
reflect on it, our reason can articulate the meaning of this experience 
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by a phenomenological description of the revelation implicit in the 
face-to-face encounter. In this regard, then, faith is not alien to 
philosophy, revelation not immune to reason.  
 Against Heidegger in particular, who represents the apotheosis of 
the egoism of ontology, Levinas uses phenomenology to establish that no 
anxious assertion of freedom can excuse a shameful failure of ethical  
responsibility, no appeal to authenticity can override the commandment 
not to murder, and that any philosophy, like Heidegger’s, that cannot 
set this fundamental limit is complicit in the Nazis’ crime against the 
Absolute.15  
 
II. Jonas: Athens and Jerusalem 
 
 The route to a Judaic moment in Hans Jonas’s philosophy is far 
more circuitous. Jonas’s work does not spring from an alleged 
opposition between Athens and Jerusalem. He unabashedly pursues 
ontology’s project of trying to comprehend the meaning of Being. What 
worries Jonas about modern philosophy in general and Heidegger’s 
thought in particular is not the spirit of ontology as such, but the 
ontological assumption of dualism: of a stark divide between human 
beings and the rest of nature. The greatest flaw in Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, according to Jonas, is not that he forgets “the 
Other,” but that he diminishes Being by denying that living nature is a 
Good-in-itself: a meaningful whole to which we belong and which 
commands our responsibility.16 
 Heidegger epitomizes the nihilistic temper of modernity. No 
longer believing that humanity belongs to a sacred order of creation or 
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“an objective order of essences in the totality of nature,” moderns 
have lost not only the grounds for cosmic piety, but also a stable 
image of human nature, even the conviction that we have a nature. Jonas 
writes: 
  
 That nature does not care one way or the other is the true abyss. 
 That only man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death, 
 alone with his contingency and the objective meaninglessness of 
 his projecting meanings, is a truly unprecedented situation... 
 There is no point in caring for what has no sanction behind 
 it in any creative intention.17  
  
 Existentialism is no idiosyncracy within modern thought, 
according to Jonas, but the most complete expression of “the ethical 
vacuum” caused by two key assumptions of the modern credo: 1) that the 
idea of obligation is a human invention, not a discovery based on the 
objective reality of the Good-in-itself; and 2) that the rest of Being 
is indifferent to our experience of obligation.18 Jonas challenges these 
modern assumptions and aims to disclose, in a manner consistent with 
modern science, "a principle of ethics which is ultimately grounded 
neither in the authority of the self nor in the needs of the community, 
but in an objective assignment by the nature of things."19 Jonas’s 
recovery of the meaning of Being unfolds in three stages: existential, 
ontological, and theological. Our journey through the first two stages 
will be brief as I have been asked to focus on the Judaic dimension of 
Jonas's thought.20 My main object is to track how Jonas relates the 
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Good-in-itself - the ultimate object of our ethical responsibility - to 
his Judaic God.  
 In The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas offers "an existential 
interpretation of biological facts," arguing that "concern for one's 
being" is not reserved for Dasein alone, but is present in "an 
ascending scale" of perception and action among plants, animals and 
human beings. Value is inherent in nature because organisms must be 
able to experience value and disvalue in order to survive and thrive. 
Jonas worries, however, that a “nihilist” may acknowledge the presence 
of subjective value in Being yet doubt “whether the whole toilsome and 
terrible drama is worth the trouble.”21  
 In The Imperative of Responsibility, Jonas seeks to demonstrate 
the objective reality of value - a Good-in-itself - because only from 
it can a binding obligation to guard Being be derived. On the basis of 
“intuitive certainty,” Jonas derives “the ontological axiom” that the 
goodness of life is not relative to already existing purposes, for “the 
very capacity to have purposes at all is a good-in-itself.”22 Through 
life, Being says “Yes” to itself. Only humans, however, are able to 
discern the ontological truth: that the presence of life in Being is 
“absolutely and infinitely” better than its absence. The ethical 
consequence of this axiom is that we have a duty to protect the life-
world. But not all living things have equal ethical status. The primary 
object of our responsibility within the Good-in-itself of living 
nature, Jonas contends, is "the idea of Man" and so the future of 
humanity. This is no anthropocentric conceit but an objective 
assignment by Being, for the testimony of life justifies our seeing 
ourselves, in our capacities for knowledge, freedom and responsibility, 
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as "a 'coming to itself' of original substance," the actualization of a 
"cosmogonic Eros."23 
 Finally, we arrive at the theological - and, specifically, Judaic 
- stage of Jonas’s thought. Having located the Good-in-itself within 
Being, what need is there for belief in God? Jonas concedes that 
neither his existential interpretation of the biological facts nor his 
ontological grounding of an imperative of responsibility demands that 
we see living nature as God’s creation. But they do not rule it out 
either, so long as our appreciation of the meaning of Being is 
compatible with faith. Jonas contends that although we can make ethical 
sense of our place in nature without appealing to a transcendent 
Creator, we can also make sense of nature - and perhaps deepen its 
meaning - by thinking of it as God’s creation.  
 Jonas proceeds from the premise that those who live from the 
Judaic tradition believe that nature is the work of a supreme Creator, 
and then asks whether this concept of God can accommodate four aspects 
of modern belief that our reason cannot deny: 1) the denial of personal 
immortality, given the evidence that mind depends on body and so death 
brings an end to both; 2) the brute reality of evil, ineradicably 
symbolized by Auschwitz; 3) modern science’s exclusion of divine 
intervention from the explanation of nature; and 4) modern cosmology’s 
evidence that the universe began with “the big bang” and that life is a 
late, rare, and precarious product of nature’s labors. Jonas concludes 
that Judaic faith in the goodness of a God who created the universe and 
revealed Himself to uniquely elected individuals remains a genuine 
option today even for those who refuse to turn their backs on what 
reason commends to them. 
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 Jonas begins his theological journey by suggesting that we can 
accept a central article of modern reason - the denial of personal 
immortality - while finding some meaning in the idea of immortality 
itself.24 He draws on two Judaic symbols - "the Book of Life" and "the 
transcendent image of God" - to develop the idea that our decisions 
carry eternal significance. Hebrew prayer speaks of our names being 
inscribed in "the Book of life" according to our individual deserts. 
The deeds we add to this record, on Jonas's interpretation, bear not on 
any future destiny of ours as individuals but on the welfare of God who 
harbors a unified memory of the world-process. Our experience of the 
call of conscience in the moment of decision attests to our holding the 
fate of "the becoming deity" in our hands, for the completion of His 
image depends on our fulfilling the promise of goodness that His gift 
of life offers us. 
 Jonas goes so far as to argue for the existence of a such a God,  
who experiences the particular events of history as they occur and 
weaves them into an ever-growing memory so that the truth about the 
past is eternally preserved, although He lacks both a foreknowledge of 
what will occur and the power to physically alter the course of 
affairs. Jonas contends that our consciousness as finite, historical 
beings depends upon our awareness of a distinction between true and 
false statements about the past. And this distinction in turn must 
refer to a universal and perfect mind for whom the past remains 
eternally present, for our hold on the long-lost past at best 
represents what seems true to us based on current evidence.  
 Our reconstruction of natural history rests on the unprovable 
assumption that nature's laws remain the same over time: that 
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contingency plays no role in their evolution. And our opinions about 
human history stand vulnerable to distorted evidence, the most extreme 
instance of which is the totalitarian effort to rewrite the historical 
archive. Jonas recounts a conversation with Hannah Arendt in which they 
imagined that Stalin had succeeded in revising the Soviet historical 
record to the point where there was no way for future generations to 
know about the Gulags. Our awareness that statements which meet our  
evidential standards of "historical" truth may be incorrigibly false 
attests to our recognition that the concept of truth about the past 
refers to a perspective that infinitely transcends our own. And, 
following Descartes's causal argument, Jonas conjectures that our idea 
of such a mind must have been caused by that mind itself.25 
 Jonas agrees with Kant that theological arguments never comprise 
proofs, but reason must still venture such speculations in order to 
address two spiritual longings. First, we may hope that the unavoidable 
question, "How did it all begin?," find an answer in a personal ground: 
a caring presence who created the world with the intention of letting 
creatures arise in its midst who are able to respond to the goodness of 
Being. Second, we may hope that nothing good be lost and forgotten: 
that there be an eternal memory even of "the gassed and burnt children 
of Auschwitz, the defaced, dehumanized victims of the camps, and all 
the other numberless victims of holocausts of our time."26 No immanent 
ontology of nature can satisfy these spiritual longings. Yet they are 
just what the Jewish God answers, symbolized as He is by "the Book of 
Life" and "the transcendent image."  
 Jonas then proposes a more "complete metaphysics" into which such 
symbols would fit. He invents “a tentative myth” that more fully 
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articulates God's nature and shows the compatibility between reason and 
faith. He imagines that God withdraws from His own creation in order 
that the world might be “for itself,” fraught with risk. God - utterly 
exhausted by his creative effort and with nothing left to give - 
pronounces His experiment to be good only with the long awaited, but 
not inevitable, emergence of life: of creatures who affirm their own 
existence. Prior to the advent of knowledge, however, God’s cause 
cannot go wrong because life retains its innocence. Eventually, with 
the evolution of humanity, life arrives at the highest intensification 
of its own value, for our capacities for knowledge and freedom 
represent “transcendence awakened to itself.”  
 But there is a price to be paid, for with knowledge and freedom 
come the power to will and do evil: an unprecedented power in this 
technological age, given our ability to destroy our species. Still, 
moral responsibility is the mark of our being made “for” God’s image, 
not “in” it. Among earthly creatures only we can acknowledge the 
transcendent importance of our deeds: that we are the “mortal trustees 
of an immortal cause.” To God’s self-limitation we owe thanks, for this 
makes room for us to help Him by taking responsibility for our own 
vulnerable affairs. We are called “to mend the world” for the sake of a 
caring, suffering and becoming God who is powerless to realize the 
promise of His creation on His own.27 
 Jonas’s myth lets him accommodate a second truth that reason 
cannot deny: evil is real. A Jew cannot avoid asking: how could the 
Lord of history - who responds to worldly events with “a mighty hand 
and an outstretched arm” - have allowed the Holocaust to happen? It 
would be a curse on God to believe that divine goodness renders the 
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evil of mass murder a mere illusion of our finite perspective. Jonas’s 
myth incorporates the speculation that God was silent not because He 
chose not to intervene but because He could not have intervened. God 
remains impotent in the physical realm, but addresses us through the 
manifest goodness of creation itself with “the mutely insistent appeal 
of his unfulfilled goal.”  
 Jonas concedes that his myth of a God who spent Himself in the 
labor of creation “strays far from the oldest Jewish teaching.” But he 
believes that the traditional theological notion of God’s omnipotence 
must be sacrificed to protect His goodness, and he finds precedent for 
his idea of a self-limiting God in the teaching of the Lurianic 
Kabbalah regarding tzimtzum, or divine self-contraction. He receives 
further confirmation in the diary of Etty Hillesum, a Dutch Jewess who 
volunteered for the Westerbork concentration camp in order “to help in 
the hospital and share in the fate of her people.” The basis for her 
martyrdom lay in her conviction that God “cannot help us,” but it is 
our turn to give back: to “help You and defend Your dwelling-place in 
us to the last.” 28 
 But can such a God meet the third dictate of reason: the 
scientific exclusion of divine intervention from the explanation of 
nature? Here again Jonas’s tzimtzum myth again comes to the rescue. 
Divine agency, of which revealed religion must speak, need not be 
represented in the form of visible, spectacular miracles that violate 
nature’s laws. Instead, it can involve the direct inspiration of 
uniquely elected individuals. For if we can accept the compatibility 
between causality and freedom in the case of human action - and Jonas 
thinks we must - then we can permit a similar compatibility in the case 
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of divine action. As laws of nature do not preclude freedom in our 
acting upon the external world, so the principles of psychology do not 
block entry to a transcendent initiative in our inner lives. In this 
respect, Jews have an advantage over Christians, Jonas contends, for 
while the counternatural miracles of Jesus’s birth, resurrection and 
ascension touch upon the core of Christian faith, “nothing much hangs 
on [such] miracles in the Old Testament.”29 
 The fourth demand of reason - the evidence of modern cosmology - 
again finds support in Jonas’s myth. For it is plausible to read the 
cosmological evidence as pointing to a physically improbable, anti-
entropic development from chaos to order: from simpler, commonplace 
concatenations of matter to more complex, unusual forms of life. Life 
itself appears to be late and rare in the universe, but far rarer is 
that most inward and self-transcending product of life: the human mind. 
Jonas speculates that the upward mobility of the evolutionary record - 
though “no guaranteed success-story” - lends credibility to the idea 
that the cause of the universe was not random.30 Still, the fate of the 
divine adventure lies with us, for only we can bear witness to the 
three pillars of the Judaic faith: 1) that God saw His creation was a 
Good-in-itself; 2) that God created humanity for His own image; and 3) 
that God made known to humanity what is good because His word is 
inscribed in our hearts.31  
 Though Jonas’s “imperative of responsibility” - never to let the 
existence or essence of humanity be threatened by the hazards of action 
- follows from Judaism’s appreciation of the goodness of life and the 
special dignity of humanity, he contends that this imperative is 
available to reasonable people everywhere, even atheists who do not 
 20 
interpret nature as God’s creation. Our duty to be “executors of an 
estate that only we can see but did not create”32 is founded, Jonas 
insists, on a judgment concerning the value of life “that can be 
separated from any thesis concerning [the world’s] authorship."33 The 
presupposition of a Creator would offer us no reason for judging the 
world to be good if the world did not justify our perception of its 
value in its own right. The person of faith should believe not that 
creation is good because God created it, but that God created it 
because He recognized life as a Good-in-itself and morally responsible 
life as the highest evolution of the Good. But this means that theistic 
- and in particular Judaic - faith, though compatible with an 
understanding of nature that commands our responsibility, is not 
necessary for such an understanding. Furthermore, although faith in 
revelation need not conflict with science, it is safer to keep ethics 
in the public realm independent of revealed truth because of the 
arrogance and dogmatism invited by the claim that one possesses "the 
one true religion" and also because religious ethics will fail to win 
broad support in an era of declining faith. 
 Hans Jonas grounds ethics ontologically in “the depths of Being.” 
Whereas Heidegger tries to persuade us of a silent call of conscience 
commanding us to be authentic in the face of the nothingness of Being, 
Jonas alerts us to an ethical imperative emanating from the plenitude 
of Being. Herein lies the meaning of Jonas’s pointedly anti-
Heideggerian motto: “Responsibility is the moral complement to the 
ontological constitution of our temporality.”34 The plenitude of Being 
opens up “a genuine present” because it gives us a future worth caring 
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for: a future that is already present in the integrity of nature, both 
outside ourselves and within. 
 
III. Dialogue 
 
 Although both Levinas and Jonas draw from their roots in Judaism 
and phenomenology to fill an ethical vacuum, epitomized by Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology, that haunts the Western philosophical tradition,  
it is hard to find common ground for dialogue between them, for their 
their ideas are couched in different languages and fundamental 
categories. Though both aim to ground an imperative of responsibility 
in a Good-in-itself ultimately anchored in God, their disagreements 
would seem to be so basic as to allow for no hope of rapprochement. 
These disagreements revolve around three fundamental questions:  
  
 A) Can Jews today have a theology without lapsing into theodicy?  
 B) Is the Good-in-Itself "Otherwise than Being" or within Being? 
 C) Is ethics against nature or the completion of nature? 
  
A. Can Jews Have a Theology without Theodicy? 
 
 Levinas would surely object that Jonas’s whole approach to God 
places Athens ahead of Jerusalem, onto-theology over commandment, the 
issue of faith before the requirements of mitzvot. What Jonas takes to 
be a premise of Judaic faith - that God created the universe - drives 
him to ask the traditional question of rational theology: what 
attributes must we take the Creator of the universe to have, consistent 
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with what we know from our experience of creation? Given that God’s 
goodness is the perfection most central to Judaic faith, Jonas 
concludes that we can only attribute goodness to God by limiting His 
power and foreknowledge. Having shown what the Creator's nature must be 
if He is worthy of our faith, Jonas even offers several arguments for 
God's existence.  
 From Levinas’s perspective, Jonas subordinates the living God of 
Torah and Talmud to the God of philosophers steeped in Greek ontology. 
Of this difference Levinas states: 
 
 The God of the Bible cannot be defined or proved by means of 
 logical predications and attributions. Even the superlatives of 
 wisdom, power and causality advanced by medieval ontology are 
 inadequate to the absolute otherness of God. It is not by 
 superlatives that we can think of God but by trying to identify 
 the particular interhuman events that open towards transcendence 
 and reveal the traces where God has passed. The God of ethical 
 philosophy is not “God the almighty being of creation,” but the 
 persecuted God of the prophets who is always in relation to 
 man...35  
 
 Why does Levinas insist that we can't have both the God of 
ethical philosophy and the God of rational theology: both "the Other" 
and the "almighty being of creation"? I think it is because he 
identifies rational theology with theodicy, and concludes that the 
death of this God, pronounced by Nietzsche, has "taken on the meaning 
of a quasi-empirical fact" given the horrors of the twentieth century.36 
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The rational theologian, ensnared in the logic of trying to comprehend 
the height of the Supreme Being in terms of what it means to be 
perfectly, is seduced by "the temptation of theodicy" - the fantasy 
that:  
 
 [T]he evil that fills the earth would be explained by a "grand 
 design"; it would be destined to the atonement of a sin, or 
 announce, to the ontologically limited consciousness, 
compensation  or recompense at the end of time. These super-
sensible  perspectives are invoked in order to divine, in a suffering 
that  is essentially gratuitous and absurd, and apparently arbitrary, a 
 meaning and order.37  
 
Although all religion prior to the twentieth century begins with the 
promise of salvation, according to Levinas, Auschwitz requires us 
either to abandon God or else obey the moral law independently of the 
Happy Ending, preach piety without reward, imagine that conscience 
brings us closer to God "in a more difficult, but also a more 
spiritual, way than does confidence in any kind of theodicy."38  
 In keeping with halakhic Judaism, Levinas says a Jew today must 
make sense of suffering ethically, not by way of rational theology.39  
Useless suffering is evil. Insofar as one suffers "for nothing," one 
suffers not only from something but from suffering itself.  Yet evil 
can gain ethical-religious meaning from compassion: when one makes 
one's own suffering into suffering for the suffering of others. The 
only compensation for useless suffering is the occasion it provides for 
responsibility: for taking on, as one's own, the affliction of another. 
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But this elevation of the Other neither makes his suffering "for 
something" by giving it a purpose, nor brings satisfaction to the 
righteous one, for responsibility requires that one feel ever more 
accused and take on more and more affliction.40 
 Levinas enjoins us to rethink the meaning of Jerusalem as "ethics 
without salvation": being-for-the-Other even at the expense of my own 
desire to be. "To be worthy of the messianic era," Levinas writes, "one 
must admit that ethics has a meaning even without the promises of the 
Messiah."41 Such an ethics - obedient to "an un-known God who does not 
assume a body and is open to atheism's denials"42 - is tantamount to "a 
theology without theodicy."43 The Good-in-itself does not console us but 
intensifies the burden of responsibility, and the good life is a 
stranger to all rewards except the elevation of the soul's dignity. In 
the spirit of Emil Fackenheim, Levinas states that "faith is not a 
question of the existence or non-existence of God," but of choosing to 
accept the authority of morality even "after the failure of morality."44   
 To Levinas's claim that "the God of ethical philosophy is not 
'God the almighty being of creation,' but the persecuted God of the 
prophets who is always in relation to man...," Hans Jonas would no 
doubt reply that the Creator is always in relation to man - as the 
caring, but now powerless “Ground of Being” who suffers when we fail to 
shoulder our responsibilities - but that Jews cannot bypass rational 
theology because the idea of the Creator is the central premise of 
Torah, and reason's interest in thinking to its very limits cannot be 
denied. Jonas would agree with Levinas that the central task of Jewish 
philosophy after Auschwitz is to speak of a God worthy of our faith 
because He is not responsible for suffering or the evils of history. 
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But Jonas undertakes this task in an unflinchingly theological way, 
denying that rational theology must lapse into theodicy.  
 Jonas's appeal to tzimtzum - the Kabbalic idea of the self-
contracting God - lets him symbolize a caring, suffering and becoming 
Creator for whom cosmic and human history is no guaranteed story of 
progress. Jonas's Supreme Being does not eliminate the reality of evil, 
lessen the burden of our responsibility, or diminish the sense in which 
we ought to assume our obligations towards creation ultimately for the 
sake of the Other, God, whose transcendent image it is ours to 
complete. There are, to be sure, elements of consolation in Jonas's 
theology: in particular, the thought that everything good is remembered 
for all eternity. But whatever salvation this offers does not come by 
way of personal immortality or belief in inevitable progress.  
 Though Jonas agrees with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas that 
the God of theology-as-theodicy is dead, he concurs with Levinas that 
the later Heidegger's alternative of a non-objectifying listening to 
the call of Being amounts to a pagan deification of the world: a 
natural theology in which the divine does not transcend but belongs to 
Being.45  But Jonas disagrees with Levinas about what it takes to think 
God's transcendence, contending that the theologian is beholden to 
objectifying thought and language, even though this objectification  
inevitably fails to do justice to the divine.46 Against Levinas's turn 
"beyond Being" to the Other, Jonas takes rational theology, regarding 
both God's existence and essence, to be a legitimate Jewish enterprise. 
The real task is "how to keep the necessary inadequacy of theological 
language transparent for what is to be indicated by it."47  
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 Jonas rejects the theological strategy of his teacher, Rudolf 
Bultmann: de-mythologization. Bultmann would have us translate mythical 
terms into the terms of existential philosophy so that objective 
concepts - like "God" - would return to their origin in the self-
experience of human beings. For his part, Jonas contends that the 
understanding of God should not be reduced to the self-understanding of 
man. The paradoxical sphere of divinity, he states, is better protected 
by myth, whose manifest opacity remains transparent for the ineffable 
and mysterious God, than by concepts grounded in the self-experience of 
man.48 Rational theology must take its cue from myths that:  
 
 [may] happen to adumbrate a truth which of necessity is 
unknowable  and even, in direct concepts, ineffable, yet which, by 
intimations  to our deepest experience, lays claim upon our powers 
of giving  indirect accounts of it in revocable, anthropomorphic 
images.49  
 
 The myth of tzimtzum invites theology-without-theodicy, according 
to Jonas, for God can be imagined "objectively" without our concluding 
that everything in creation expresses His will and power. Though 
suffering in general is the price of creation's independence from the 
Creator, no particular moment of suffering - and in particular, no 
human act of evil - must be for some higher purpose. Evil is real 
because people often suffer for nothing. Still, faith in God's 
existence, though it cannot be proven, is compatible with what reason 
recommends to us, and is even a plausible hypothesis given the 
unlikelihood, according to Jonas, of mind having evolved from what is 
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mindless. If God does exist, we must argue for the finitude of His 
power: the priority of the Good over His will. One diminishes the 
divine mystery by presuming that the Creator is omniscient or 
omnipotent.  
 So maybe a rapprochement between Levinas and Jonas is possible 
after all. They agree that suffering and evil are real, and the God of 
theodicy dead. After Auschwitz we must conclude that there is no good 
reason, purpose or compensation for much of the affliction that befalls 
the creatures of God's world. Theodicy makes a mockery of God. So we 
have the glimmer of a synthesis: perhaps the goodness of Jonas's now-
impotent Creator reveals itself in Levinas's "face of the other person" 
whose dignity commands my responsibility. Levinas's halakhic response 
to the problem of evil seems to open the possibility of a 
reconciliation with Jonas's employment of the Kabbalic myth of 
tzimtzum.  
 
B. Is the Good Within Being or "Otherwise than Being"? 
 
 A tantalizing prospect of synthesis, but far too hasty. For Jonas 
would object that Levinas, in refusing to conceive of God theologically 
as the author of nature, distances himself from another article of 
Judaic faith: the inherent goodness of life. By imagining God only as 
the ultimate Other of the interhuman ethical relation, Levinas severs 
God from nature: the Other from Being. 
 Recall that, on Jonas's myth, the emergence of life justifies 
God's judgment that His creation is a Good-in-itself, for life says 
"Yes!" to Being. With the advent of human knowledge and freedom, this 
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goodness is entrusted to man "to be completed, saved or spoiled by what 
he will do to himself and the world." Our primary ethical 
responsibility, however, is towards the Idea or essence of humanity in 
which each of us participates, for our form of life represents the 
highest actualization of Being's purposiveness, and so it is a matter 
of ontological import that we safeguard the future of our kind. By 
Jonas's lights, Levinas misconstrues the object of our responsibility 
by locating it "beyond Being," thus leaving out the ethical resources 
of the life-world from which we evolved and on which we depend, and 
favoring the particular Other person over the universal of humanity in 
which we share and which grounds our responsibility for future 
generations. 
 Levinas would retort that Jonas is mistaken to locate the Good 
within Being. First, Jonas's God has become ethically irrelevant 
because his Good-in-itself has ontological standing independent of God. 
Second,  nature is incapable of supporting ethics, according to 
Levinas, for nature, stripped of any reference to the Other who 
commands the self from “beyond Being,” is the site of egoism: the drive 
of each living thing to organize the world around its own needs. 
Levinas’s divide between Being and the Other is rooted in a major 
premise: that Being - the totality of nature - includes value only from 
the egoistic perspective of organisms willing their own survival and 
prosperity. Ethics can open up, Levinas insists, only if "there is a 
rupture with Being's own law: the law of evil"50 - if, that is, I am 
available to an "otherwise than Being" who calls me to transcend my 
natural self. He states: 
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 With the appearance of the human - and this is my entire 
 philosophy - there is something more important than my life, and 
 that is the life of the Other. That is unreasonable. Man is an 
 unreasonable animal. Most of the time my life is dearer to me; 
 most of the time one looks after oneself. But we cannot not 
admire  saintliness.51  
 
The human is a radically new phenomenon for it breaks with pure Being's 
struggle for life which is ultimately "a question of might."52 
 Jonas rejects Levinas’s dualistic - even "Gnostic" - premise that 
nature contains no Good-in-itself. But perhaps we have a second 
opportunity for rapprochement, for Levinas concedes, upon being asked 
whether animals should be considered as Others, that "the ethical 
extends to all living beings," and he poignantly acknowledges the 
possibility of "a transcendence in the animal." He recounts the story 
of Bobby, a dog who found his way into Levinas's prisoner-of-war unit 
and faithfully befriended the captives who had become a subhuman "gang 
of apes" for both the guards and local citizens who passed them by. 
Levinas remarks that for Bobby "there was no doubt we were men," and he 
crowns the dog "the last Kantian in Nazi Germany," even if Bobby lacked 
"the brain needed to universalize maxims and inclinations."53  So 
perhaps, even for Levinas, ethics is more implicated in nature, the 
Good more internal to Being, than his opposition between Being and the 
Other would have us think. 
 
C. Is Ethics Against Nature or the Completion of Nature? 
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 Again, however, peace is not so quickly at hand, for Levinas 
insists that we think ethics against nature, while Jonas grounds the   
imperative of responsibility in his ontological naturalism. Jonas would 
identify two pitfalls in Levinas's rejection of naturalism. First, if 
all of nature is God’s creation and human life is a recent and rare 
outcome of nature’s own evolution, it is odd to see our coming-into-
being as so discontinuous with the rest of the life-world. Levinas and 
Jonas agree that only humans are ethical creatures subject to an 
imperative emanating from the Good, but Jonas sees the capacity for 
responsibility as a development of life’s inherent goodness, not an 
external imposition of the Good upon life. Even if Levinas anecdotally 
acknowledges capacities for responsiveness in non-human animals which 
suggest that there is gradation and teleology within living nature, his 
dualism of Being and the Other, Jonas would argue, deprives him of the 
categories to do justice to his own insight.  
 Second, Levinas holds that the ethical encounter is asymmetrical 
because an equal, mutual relationship between self and other is still 
too tainted with selfish concern. “The ethical rapport with the 
face...” is unnatural, he states, for I must “subordinate my existence 
to the other.” 54 Jonas, by contrast, locates the drama of our ethical 
life within nature. On the one hand, we are inclined by nature to give 
priority to the interests of family and friends. This is not wholly 
selfish, for such special relationships of caring - especially between 
parent and child - are often marked by generosity and genuine self-
sacrifice. Against Levinas’s Hobbesian view of human nature, Jonas 
offers a more Humean appreciation of our moral sentiments. On the other 
hand, Jonas recognizes that if we simply follow our natural passions, 
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sympathetic though they be, we will not be up to the task imposed by 
his imperative of responsibility, for it requires a level of respect 
for humanity and future generations that does not come naturally. This 
is the Kantian moment in Jonas's idea of our ultimate obligation: the 
requirement of suppressing our natural, present-centered inclinations 
for the sake of our duty towards a distant future that will not serve 
our own happiness.  
 Still, there remains a classical, Platonic/Aristotelean moment in 
Jonas's ontological Grundlegung, for the Good in light of which we 
ought to be moved by respect for "the Idea of man" is a natural one, 
and we can come to feel that our commitment to it represents the 
actualization of "cosmogonic Eros" and the fulfillment of our largest 
self-concern, not the sacrifice of it for the Other’s sake. Jonas's 
sense of justice is animated by the Platonic notion that all human 
individuals share in the Form of humanity and that this Form is a 
manifestation of the Good. In this regard, then, the cultivation of 
virtues corresponding to Jonas's ethics for the future should be seen 
as contributing to the eudaimonia of the person who embodies them. 
 From Levinas’s perspective, of course, this enlargement of self-
concern only betrays the extent to which Jonas has been seduced by 
Athens - and Socrates’s erotic dream of realizing his own good by 
assimilating himself to the Idea of justice through the exercise of 
reason - rather than following the unreasonable path of Jerusalem which 
commands us to be holy: to be moved by selfless love of the Other. 
Levinas would be correct to call Jonas a "Greek" when it comes to 
ethics, for Jonasian responsibility requires not the suppression of our 
nature for the Other's sake but the completion of our nature in a pious 
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appreciation of the organic whole to which we belong. But Jonas would 
reject Levinas's judgement that one cannot be a Greek in ethics and a 
Jew at the level of faith. 
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IV. Rapprochement? 
 
 On the three fundamental questions we have explored -  A) Can 
Jews today have a theology without lapsing into a discredited 
theodicy?, B) Is the Good-in-Itself "Otherwise than Being" or within 
Being?, and C) Is ethics against nature or the completion of nature? - 
Levinas and Jonas appear to be at loggerheads. Levinas believes that 
Jews must abandon conceiving of God onto-theologically and should 
instead approach Him ethically - as "Otherwise than Being" - through 
the face of the Other person, whose "height" commands me not to murder 
and even to sacrifice, for his good alone, my natural desire to exist. 
Jonas believes that there is and must be a place for theological 
speculation in Judaism, but that we can intuit the Good-in-itself as 
the first principle of Being and understand ethics as the completion of 
nature, once we reject reductive materialism and appreciate nature 
ontologically. 
 The deepest root of the ethical difference between our two Jewish 
thinkers lies in where they locate the disease - the ethical vacuum - 
for which the appeal to the Good provides the necessary therapy. For 
Levinas, the disease inheres in human nature itself which, left to its 
own devices, tends towards the worst. Levinas is haunted by a world he 
has known all too well: in which the egoism underlying the social 
contract has reared its head and made a mockery of the conventional 
prohibition against murder. Unless murder is forbidden by an authority 
higher than nature, he worries, no standard allows us to condemn 
barbarity once the vulnerable cease to be protected by the social 
contract. Levinas believes we must go further than those who provide an 
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"enlightened" defense of individual rights based on the moral equality 
of all persons. For the absolute moral worth of an individual can only 
reveal itself when the face of the Other commands one from “beyond 
nature” and “from a height,” and this command precedes the neutral, 
impartial requirements of legal-political justice. “Thou shalt not 
murder” is more heteronomous than any laws resulting from the neutral 
posture of human autonomy or agreement. 
 Levinas would have us think that only love for the unique Other 
enables us to break out of the prison of self-concern. For I go towards 
God not by securing my place in Eternity but by giving it all up for 
the Infinity of time. And this I can do by realizing the "possibility, 
through sacrifice, of giving meaning to the Other and to the world 
which, though without me, still counts for me, and for which I am 
answerable."55 Only in fearing the death of the Other more than my own 
am I truly open to "a future that will never be my present."56 
 For Levinas, the acid test of responsibility only occurs when, 
for the good of the Other, I may have to pay an unreasonably high 
price. The Holocaust would never have happened if individuals had 
passed this test: if they had not only been able to acknowledge the 
face of the Other beyond the stereotypes imposed by Nazi ideology, but 
also been willing to jeopardize their own comfort and even survival for 
these Others in spite of the fact that shutting them out conformed with 
Nazi justice. But it was only natural to ask: Why should I take it upon 
myself to break the law and thereby risk my family's safety in order to 
save a public enemy whom it is acceptable, even required, to regard 
with contempt? 
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 Jonas joins Levinas in believing that the liberal tradition of 
individual rights (not to mention the anti-cosmopolitanism of 
Heidegger) fails to meet the ethical challenge of our time. For Jonas, 
too, the task of being our brother's keeper - tantamount to hearing the 
outcry of the invisible, impotent deity - demands far more of us than 
Biblical wisdom's liberal descendant - "Pursue your own happiness so 
long as you do not violate the rights of others" - would have us think. 
But for Jonas that challenge is to defend not the perennial figure of 
the saint, but an image of the natural Good robust enough to ground our 
responsibility towards future generations who, as not-yet-existent, 
have no individual rights. No less acquainted than Levinas with the 
depths to which human nature has sunk in his century, Jonas worries 
that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions." If Hannah Arendt 
awakens us to the idea that most of the evil in the age of 
totalitarianism has stemmed not from wickedness but thoughtlessness -  
the willingness of bureaucrats like Adolf Eichmann to do their jobs 
without asking questions - Jonas is most concerned that our 
technological prowess tempts us with “the bait of utopia”: the fantasy 
that our ever-expanding power to “master and possess nature” can only 
improve our lives.  
 Jonas worries that our hubris risks sacrificing the good for the 
sake of the perfect. Unless nature itself - and our own nature - can be 
shown to be a Good-in-itself, there is no standard that allows us to 
set limits to what we might do in the name of bettering our condition, 
both within ourselves and without, through the use of 
psychopharmaceutical, genetic, and nuclear technologies, among others. 
Jonas holds, therefore, that the dualistic belief, shared by Levinas, 
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that nature harbors no Good-in-itself is nihilistic. For if nature 
presents us with no ethical norms, then no effort to change our own 
nature in the name of perfection, convenience or novelty could be 
condemned as a transgression of essential limits or a violation of a 
standard beyond any convention of our own making.  
 Yet let us not forget - and do we here have one last chance at 
rapprochement? - that Jonas, like Levinas, is looking for a sense of 
responsibility that will orient us towards a future that we will not be 
there to experience. Though Jonas's imperative commands not love of the 
unique Other but a kind of intergenerational justice, there is an 
asymmetry in this justice, for it requires sacrificing not our lives 
but our short-term interests for the sake of long-term benefits that we 
- and even our childrens' children - will not enjoy. Future generations 
will profit from what we bequeath to them, but we will not profit from 
what they make of our bequest. This is the element of saintliness that 
makes Jonas's imperative of responsibility so demanding. He, like 
Levinas, sees that the task of ethics is to explain why I should care 
about "a future without me." But while Levinas is obsessed by the 
perennial issue of what it takes to rescue strangers in dire 
circumstances, Jonas focuses on the novel question of what it will take 
to protect conditions under which human individuals can flourish at 
all. Perhaps these are two aspects of a single challenge after all. 
 But whose philosophy is more authentically Judaic: Jonas’s onto-
theological naturalism or Levinas’s ethical supernaturalism? I leave 
that as an open question. From a philosophical point-of-view, however, 
the issue is irrelevant, for both thinkers claim that the Good commands 
everyone: Jew and non-Jew alike. While Levinas holds that one only 
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loves God by loving Other persons, Jonas claims, in effect, that one 
only loves God by caring for humanity as the highest expression of 
nature’s intrinsic majesty. They agree, however, that Yahweh is so 
self-effacing that one can hear the commandment of the Good without 
giving it the name of “Yahweh.” And this implies another piece of 
common ground: that the self-effacing or self-limiting God leaves us 
responsible to answer His prayer that we improve the world. God’s 
creative power now lies not in His ability to intervene in the physical 
world and guarantee that good prevails over evil, but in His ever-
present capacity - through the Good - to inspire us to take His 
commandment to heart.
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